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Solidarity or Dualization? 
Social Governance, Union Preferences and Unemployment Benefit Adjustment in 
Belgium and France 
 
 
In accounts of European nations’ adjustment trajectories over the last quarter-century, 
Belgium and France are usually considered analogous cases. Both countries are members of 
the Bismarckian family of social protection, with production regimes that are underpinned by 
real, if imperfectly operating, mechanisms of coordination, via the involvement of the ‘social 
partners’ (trade unions and employers’ associations) in national-level social and economic 
policy making (see Eichhorst and Marx in this volume). Partly because of these macro-
institutional characteristics, both are understood to be experiencing difficult transitions to a 
post-industrial economic structure, with low levels of service-sector employment growth and 
stubbornly high rates of structural inactivity. Though in both cases the adjustment trajectory 
followed since the late 1970s has created problems for social cohesion and long-term 
economic sustainability, in neither have overt structural reforms proved easy to implement. 
 
Given these parallels, it is striking that in one key institutional field patterns of policy 
development have actually followed markedly divergent tracks in Belgium and France in 
recent decades. In 1980, the Belgian and French unemployment insurance regimes both 
combined income maintenance and anti-poverty functions within a single benefit scheme. 
Since then, however, very different parametric choices have been made in each country to 
attempt to adapt these systems to persistently high levels of unemployment. In France, 
insurance-based and assistance-based support for the unemployed was explicitly separated in 
the early 1980s, an institutional dualization that has subsequently stabilized and served as an 
adjustment model for other branches of the French income maintenance system (Palier, 2005). 
In Belgium, by contrast, unemployment protection instead “evolved from a social insurance 
system fairly much in the classic Bismarckian mould into what effectively amounts to a 
minimum income protection system” (Marx, 2007: 122). 
 
This chapter explores the political dynamics behind the contrasting institutional and 
distributive choices in the unemployment benefit reforms of these two otherwise similar 
countries, in the process shedding light on the politics of welfare state dualization more 
generally. In particular, it suggests that rather fine-grained differences in social governance – 
 2 
the way that social policy space is shared between the state and social actors (Ebbinghaus, 
2010) – have had a crucial impact on processes of unemployment policy preference formation 
in Belgian and French trade unions, whose influence has driven policy down distinctive paths. 
While it has long been recognized that the administrative structures of the welfare state can 
impact upon the power resources of unions (Rothstein, 1992; Scruggs, 2002), this chapter 
shows how they can also shape their organizational interests in ways that are consequential 
for patterns of policy choice. More generally, the impact of such proximate institutional 
environments on preference formation implies that common structural tendencies towards a 
post-industrial employment structure can be expected to elicit diverse social policy responses 
in different countries, even within the same welfare-production regime. 
 
The chapter is organized in three sections. Section 1 summarizes some key features of the 
economic and regulatory context in which Belgian and French unemployment policies have 
evolved since the early 1980s, elaborating more fully on the similarities in the overall socio-
economic adjustment trajectories of the two cases. Section 2 then examines the divergent 
development of income protection policies for the unemployed since 1980 in more detail, 
focusing on both the institutional structures of protection and the social rights that different 
groups of the unemployed enjoy within these. Section 3 discusses the limitations of a range of 
alternative explanations for the cross-case variation, before demonstrating how the structure 
of social governance institutions has shaped unions’ organizational preferences and 
encouraged them to champion very different parametric reform options in the unemployment 
protection sphere. The chapter concludes by drawing out some of the implications of the 
comparison for our understanding of the politics of welfare state dualization as well as – 
somewhat more speculatively – for our appreciation of its impact on social cohesion. 
 
1. Down the same path: Belgian and French labor markets after the ‘golden age’ 
 
In France and Belgium, as everywhere in the developed world, unemployment increased 
sharply in the wake of the oil shocks of the mid-1970s. Unlike in some other European 
countries, though, they remained stubbornly high for much of the next quarter-century. In this 
respect the Belgian performance has been marginally better than the French, but arguably 
only because a greater share of the non-employed have been encouraged out of the labor 
market altogether. In the mid 2000s the inactivity rate in Belgium was the highest in Western 
Europe, some 5% above the EU average level. Rates of inactivity are particularly high among 
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older citizens in both countries, more than 10% above the EU average in France and nearly 
15% in Belgium. Furthermore, Belgium has long had rates of long-term unemployment that 
are above the European average, and has been joined in this by France since the turn of the 
millennium (Eurostat, 2010a). 
 
Belgium and France thus represent two clear examples of the ‘welfare without work’ 
syndrome that has plagued many continental European countries since the late 1970s. 
Responsibility for this problem is seen to reside with institutional features of continental 
European labor markets and social protection systems, in particular a tradition of strict 
employment protection and high non-wage labor costs at the bottom end of the labor market, 
as a result of the contribution-based financing structure of social protection (Eichhorst and 
Hemerijck, 2010; Esping-Andersen and Regini, 2000; Scharpf, 1997). 
 
There have, however, been only timid attempts to make labor markets more generally flexible 
in either country. In Belgium, while there were some reforms to the regulation of collective 
dismissals, attempts to reduce levels of individual employment protection “have remained 
gridlocked because of a fundamental disagreement between the social partners” (De Deken, 
2009: 189). Likewise in France, collective dismissals have seen rounds of de- and re-
regulation, but the protection of individual employees under regular employment contracts 
has remained unchanged, and generally off-limits politically (Cahuc and Zybellberg, 2009). 
There has been rather more activity around the regulation of temporary employment contracts 
in both countries; this has been relaxed in Belgium, and tightened in France. Despite the 
differing directions of regulatory change in this area, each country has nonetheless witnessed 
an expansion of temporary employment, though interestingly by rather less in Belgium (from 
5.4% of all employment in 1983 to a peak of 10.3% in 1999) than in France (from 3.3% of all 
employment in 1983 to a peak of 15.5% in 2000) (OECD, 2010a). In a comparable way but to 
differing degrees, temporary employment has been used by employers to circumvent the strict 
regulation of regular employment, in line with the ‘dual path’ to labor market reform common 
to continental welfare-production regimes (see Eichhorst and Marx in this volume; Iversen, 
2005: 257-68). 
 
A similar dynamic can be seen at work in employment policy measures, which in both 
countries have been heavily focused on the problem of non-wage labor costs. These were 
initially addressed through targeted subsidies to employers taking on certain categories of 
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workers (young people, the long-term unemployed, trainees), but have tended to gradually 
expand to cover all employment up to a certain wage level (Clegg, 2011; De Deken, 2011). 
Along with extensive creation of temporary and part-time jobs in the public and para-public 
sectors, again targeted on specific groups of the unemployed, such measures have contributed 
to the flexibilization of the lower reaches of the labor market in both countries, and provided 
an employment foothold for low-skilled workers who would otherwise be priced out of jobs. 
But they have also served to increase the social acceptability and politically legitimacy of an 
adjustment strategy that remains fundamentally characterized by a de facto acceptance of high 
unemployment or non-employment. 
 
The political context of the two countries differs significantly, but in neither has it been 
conducive to encouraging a more decisive break with the regulatory status quo. Due to the 
politicization and division of organized labor and the often execrable relations between the 
social partners and the state, the negotiation of explicit and encompassing ‘social pacts’ has 
remained a vain hope in France (Ebbinghaus and Hassel, 2000). Belgium, too, has been 
characterized by “troubled and conflictual” relationships between the social partners 
(Hemerijck et al., 2000: 193), though this has not prevented many attempts to negotiate a new 
policy direction. However “there is no country where governments designed so many pacts, 
plans and proposals … with so little success” (Hemerijck and Visser, 2000: 253). Belgian 
governments have, furthermore, been poorly positioned to drive through unilateral reforms; 
weak and often short-lived coalition governments operating in a context of deepening 
federalism and growing linguistic conflict have struggled to exert authority (Hemerijck and 
Marx, 2010; Kuipers, 2006). In France executives face fewer obvious institutional barriers, 
but elites from across the political spectrum have been accused of lacking the courage and 
imagination to exploit their room for maneuver (Smith, 2004; Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2009). 
Though institutional change has been in many respects profound, it has been incremental and 
lacking in obvious strategic direction (Hall, 2006). 
 
In sum, there are many parallels in the post-industrial adjustment trajectories of Belgium and 
France. Adaptations to the changing economic structure have been hesitant and marginal, with 
the employment conditions of the lowest skilled and least well-integrated workers most often 
the privileged adjustment variable. In both countries there has been an apparent desire to 
preserve – or at least unwillingness to challenge – the protections enjoyed by more stably 
integrated labor market ‘insiders’. Similar institutional decisions and non-decisions, with 
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similar distributional implications, have thus characterized much Belgian and French labor 
market policy making over the past quarter-century. It is against this backdrop that the 
divergent development in Belgian and French unemployment protection policies over the 
same period is particularly striking. 
 
2. Solidarity versus dualization: Unemployment benefit policies in Belgium and France 
since 1980 
 
Looking only at expenditure figures, the story of unemployment benefit policies in Belgium 
and France since the mid-1980s would at first glance appear to be one of convergence. 
Belgium has traditionally spent more than France on unemployment benefits, and while this 
remains true today the gap between the two countries on this indicator has narrowed 
somewhat in the last two-to-three decades. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Source: Own calculations from OECD, 2010b and Eurostat, 2010a:  calculated as 
expenditure on unemployment benefits as % GDP/ unemployment as % labor force. 
 
This dynamic of increasingly similar expenditure levels has, however, been driven by very 
different institutional developments and distributive logics. While in 1980 unemployment 
protection in both countries essentially comprised one encompassing benefit tier covering all 
unemployed claimants, this was an early victim of economic pressures in France, giving way 
to a dualized approach to unemployment protection organized around a distinction between 
‘insurance’ and ‘solidarity’ in which the quality of benefit entitlement became more 
dependent on prior work and contribution. But no parallel institutional evolution occurred in 
Belgium, where unemployment benefit entitlements have actually tended to become less, 
rather than more, status dependent. While Belgium and France invest increasingly similar 
sums in unemployment protection, the recent period has in fact seen them diverge in how they 
target these collective resources on, and deliver them to, different parts of the unemployed 
population. 
 
France: Stripping the solidarity out of insurance 
Comment [SH1]: Or is there a 
figure I missed? Also: could table 1 or 
the development of expenditures also 
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An encompassing benefit system was only introduced in France in 1979, when the tax-
financed unemployment assistance system was absorbed by the contribution-financed 
unemployment insurance system, the culmination of a ‘logic of integration’ that had been 
underway since the establishment the latter in 1958 (Daniel, 2000: 36-36). Under the 1979 
agreement reached between the Barre government and the social partners – who manage 
unemployment insurance through periodically renegotiated national-level collective 
agreements, extended after agreement by the state – the newly integrated system was jointly 
financed from contributions and a state subsidy, with management control remaining formally 
with the social partners. 
 
In a context of fast-rising unemployment, the new system soon ran into serious financial 
difficulties, compounded by the use of unemployment insurance funds to finance a vast 
expansion of early retirement pensions under the first Mitterrand administration. The 
employers in particular protested about this ‘improper’ usage of unemployment benefits, and 
refused to agree to the contribution increases necessary to restore the financial equilibrium of 
the unemployment insurance fund, UNEDIC1.. The government however conditioned any 
increase in the level of state subsidy on an enhancement of its managerial oversight of the 
system, something the social partners refused to countenance (Clegg, 2005). The resultant 
deadlock was confirmed by the employers formally suspending their participation in 
UNEDIC in November 1982. 
 
Their return in 1984 resulted from an implicit tripartite agreement on a new division of labour 
between the social partners and the state in French unemployment protection policy, premised 
on a more actuarial conception of unemployment insurance. The then president of the main 
French employers’ confederation provided the clearest statement of this in a newspaper article 
published in the wake of the employer walk-out in 1982. He argued that a “new bipartite 
unemployment insurance, and not an unemployment assistance, must be put in place. The 
former can be for a large part financed by the contributions of workers and firms. The latter is 
entirely an issue of national solidarity”2. The idea was to better distinguish between the sphere 
of insurance (benefits financed through social contributions and managed by the social 
partners) and the sphere of so-called ‘national solidarity’ (benefits financed by taxes, often 
means-tested, and managed by the state); an institutional dualization of unemployment 
                                                 
1 Union nationale interprofessionelle pour l’emploi dans l’industrie et le commerce 
2 Interview with Yvon Gattaz in Le Monde, 23rd November 1982. 
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protection based on a ‘clarification’ between the functions of income maintenance and 
protection against poverty.   
 
The clarification mechanism was the contribution principle – the relationship between the 
amounts of contributions paid in work and the level and duration of entitlements in 
unemployment – which was now applied with a rigor never before seen in French 
unemployment insurance. A 1982 government decree first introduced distinct benefit streams 
in which rights to unemployment insurance benefits no longer varied just on the basis of age, 
but also on the basis of contribution history. The 1984 unemployment insurance agreement 
between the social partners then excluded those with the shortest contribution records from 
any eligibility, and shortened the duration of entitlement for others, on the basis that first-time 
job seekers and the longer-term unemployed would, if needy, receive benefits under the new 
‘solidarity’ system (see below). The new organizing principles generated winners as well as 
losers, though: the calculation formula for the basic unemployment insurance benefit 
introduced in 1984 meant that replacement rate and duration of benefits for those with longer 
contribution histories actually improved slightly (Daniel and Tuchszirer, 1999: 290). 
 
The eligibility and entitlement rules for unemployment insurance have been recalibrated on 
numerous occasions subsequently, with the economic context at the time of renegotiation of 
collective agreements largely determining whether changes are expansionary or restrictive 
overall. Due to the continuing centrality of the contribution principle, though, the distribution 
among different groups in the unemployed population of cuts in the bad times and benefits in 
the good has been far from even. During the 1990s and most of the 2000s negotiated cuts to 
unemployment insurance always fell most heavily on those with weak labor market 
attachment, while benefits have been directed to those with longer work records (Daniel, 
2000; Tuchszirer, 2008). The 1992 reform of unemployment benefits, negotiated in a context 
of fast rising unemployment and concerns about public deficits in the run up to the European 
single-currency, offers perhaps the clearest example. Aside from the introduction of a so-
called ‘degressivity’ mechanism, under which benefit levels were reduced as unemployment 
duration lengthened, the reform levered most savings through increases in minimum 
contribution periods and reductions in benefit durations for those with the shortest 
contribution records. Those who found themselves excluded from access to insurance benefits 
as a result – the beneficiary rate fell from 52.5% in 1992 to 45.3% in 1994 – were thus 
disproportionately young, long term unemployed, or those entering unemployment at the end 
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of a fixed-term contract (Daniel and Tuchszirer, 1999: 307). When as a result of this reform 
the unemployment insurance system returned to a healthy surplus by the middle of the 
decade, these cuts were not simply repaired, however. Instead, in 1995 a new implicit early 
retirement benefit was introduced in the unemployment insurance scheme, and the following 
year the application of the degressivity mechanism was slowed down – changes that both 
benefited those who already had entitlement to unemployment insurance. 
 
Allied to the rapid expansion of temporary employment, the effect of these parametric reform 
choices was that the percentage of unemployed people not entitled to insurance benefits 
continued to fall over the remainder of the 1990s, reaching nearly 60% late in 1999 
(UNIstatis, 2010). Even when needy, only a small proportion of this group could fall back on 
unemployment assistance benefits, moreover. From its introduction in the 1984 reform, the 
main French unemployment assistance scheme combined means-testing with contribution 
conditions – 5 years of employment in the last 10 – that were stricter than in unemployment 
insurance. And while a flat-rate unemployment assistance scheme for those seeking stable 
labor market integration had also been introduced in 1984, eligibility for its main group of 
potential beneficiaries – young people – was limited by a requirement of holding certain kinds 
of technical or professional diplomas. This benefit was also very low relative to the minimum 
wage, which possibly explains why there was almost no protest when eligibility for it was 
removed from young people entirely in the 1992 budget, causing the stock of beneficiaries to 
fall from 110 000 in December 1991 to 29 000 one year later, and 17 000 by December 1995 
(ibid.). In 1999, unemployment assistance only increased the beneficiary rate of all French 
unemployment protection by around 10%. 
 
In this context, an important share of the burden of supporting parts of the unemployed 
population has fallen on France’s general minimum income program. When a national 
minimum income was created in France in 1988 it had 400,000 beneficiaries, but by 1995 its 
caseload had swelled to just under 1 million. 1993 – following the  major unemployment 
insurance reform – witnessed the biggest single year-on-year caseload increase (DREES, 
2010). Though until the late 2000s it was not formally part of labor market policy, 
fluctuations in French social assistance caseloads owe most to the lagged effect of changes in 
the employment context, and the adjustments of the unemployment insurance system that 
follow. It is thus general social assistance that is today the main pillar of the ‘national 
solidarity’ tier of France’s dualized system of unemployment protection (Audier et al., 1998). 
Comment [SH2]: No protest? Was 
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Due notably to the fact that under-25s are not entitled to social assistance in France, however, 
it represents only a partial safety stretched under the unemployment insurance system. 
 
During the 2000s, the proportion of unemployed receiving insurance benefits in France has 
increased somewhat from its historic lows of the late 1990s (Seeleib-Kaiser et al in this 
volume). In a reform that introduced new activation requirements for recipients of insurance 
benefits, in 2000 the social partners negotiated a relaxation of contribution conditions. The 
2009 unemployment insurance agreement then traded some reduction in benefit levels and 
durations for better contributors against some limited benefit rights for those with the shortest 
work records (Clegg, 2011). But even though a 2008 reform aligned the ‘responsibilities’ – 
such as the job-search requirements and suitable work conditions – of all job-seekers, the 
rights-provision for different categories of French job-seekers retains a marked institutional 
duality, and an individuals’ prior labor market attachment continues to be a strong 
determinant of the level and the type of benefit they will receive if unemployed. 
 
Belgium: Preserving inclusiveness through residualization 
Unlike France, in the early 1980s Belgium had a long history of institutionally integrated 
provision for all the unemployed. From its inception the unemployment benefit system was in 
principle open to everyone who was unable to find a job (De Lathouwer, 2002). Though some 
contributory requirements were introduced in 1951, they remained very loose, intended 
essentially to avoid certain kinds of abuse (Palsterman, 2005: 156). The 1951 regulations also 
extended eligibility for unemployment insurance to young people with no professional 
experience, but having recently finished their studies. The functional need for supplementary 
systems of provision was further diminished by the fact that, uniquely among developed 
countries, entitlement to unemployment benefit has always been unlimited in time in 
Belgium. Though a national Minimum Income Scheme was introduced in 1974, there were 
for the above reasons very few unemployed people among its beneficiaries. 
 
Originally Belgian unemployment benefits were also entirely flat rate, though with levels 
differentiated between rural and urban areas, on the one hand, and men and women, on the 
other. A more ‘Bismarckian’ earnings-related benefit structure was adopted in 1971, with 
benefits henceforth paying 60% of the previous salary for the first year of unemployment, and 
40% thereafter to all the unemployed who were not heads of households (for whom benefit 
levels were maintained). However, the application of a strict insurance principle was limited 
 10 
not only by the continuing reference to heads of households, but also by the ceiling for the 
salary on which benefits were calculated being rather low. The system was financed from 
contributions by employers and employees, the rates of which were fixed by law. A state 
subsidy had however always covered any difference between contributory receipts and 
expenditures, and by 1981 – after the explosion of unemployment in the 1970s – this subsidy 
represented just under 80% of total funds (De Deken, 2011). 
 
With Belgian’s exceptionally high indebtedness becoming a major concern, efforts were 
intensified in the early 1980s to reduce government contributions to unemployment insurance. 
Contribution ceilings that had been relaxed in the 1970s were scrapped altogether in 1982, 
and by 1993 the government subsidy represented only 7% of unemployment insurance 
finance (De Lathouwer, 2002). During the same period, though, an increasing share of 
unemployment insurance funds was simultaneously being devoted to early retirement 
measures, mainly providing unemployment benefit ‘top-ups’ to older unemployed workers 
who did not have access to collectively negotiated arrangements of the same kind introduced 
in the 1970s (De Deken, 2011). These classic ‘labor shedding’ measures have remained 
important up to the present day, and go a long way in explaining Belgium’s very low activity 
rates among over 55s in particular. Although there is growing recognition that such measures 
are unsustainable, efforts to scale them back substantially have always foundered (De Deken, 
2009). Given this, cost-cutting pressures resulting from growing concerns about levels of non-
wage costs were very quickly instead focused on the structure of unemployment benefits for 
young and prime-age workers. 
 
While cost-containment initiatives were indeed introduced in this area from the early 1980s in 
Belgium, they were however far more concentrated on reducing benefit levels than on 
reducing the scope or coverage of the unemployment benefit system by tightening 
contribution requirements or limiting the duration of payments.. Benefit reductions were not 
necessarily universal, though. In 1980, the group of ‘non heads of households’ was further 
subdivided for the purposes of calculating benefit rights into ‘singles’ and ‘cohabitees’. 
Benefits for the latter – a group comprised essentially of school leavers living with parents 
and married women with partners in work – became degressive in time, falling to an 
eventually flat-rate allowance which took no account of prior earnings. In 1982 benefits for 
young unemployed graduates – again, unless they were heads of households – were then 
disconnected from the minimum wage and replaced with a low flat-rate allowance, called the 
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bridging allowance. The principle for reigning in the cost of benefits in Belgian 
unemployment protection was thus a kind of need-testing under which need was inferred from 
age and household status (De Deken, 2009, 2011; Hemerijck and Marx, 2010), rather than a 
stricter application of the contribution principle as had been seen in France. 
 
Subsequent parametric reforms to the benefit system have generally further confirmed this 
strengthening of a basic protection orientation (Palsterman, 2005). Having been decoupled 
from wages in the late 1970s, benefits were soon totally disconnected from consumer price 
developments and their level regulated on a discretionary basis. In practice the relative value 
of maximum benefits was allowed to stagnate, not being increased even in line with inflation 
in 1984, 1985 or 1986, while minimum benefits were increased more rapidly, albeit somewhat 
selectively, in function of perceived household needs; ‘heads of households’ did best, the 
‘cohabitee’ group created by the 1981 reforms worst. As a result, the gap between maximum 
and minimum benefits for a head of household fell from around 25% in the late 1970s to just 
over 10% in the mid-1990s (Marx, 2007: 132). In the process, the insurance function of 
Belgian unemployment benefits has been increasingly abandoned; average benefit rates have 
fell from a little more than 40% of the average gross wage in the private sector in 1980 to 
around 27% by 2004 (Faniel, 2008: 55).  
 
There have been very few efforts, by contrast, to limit entrance or continuing entitlement to 
unemployment benefit receipt; time-unlimited unemployment benefit has been a ‘sacred cow’ 
in Belgian social policy debates (Kuipers, 2006: 82-83). The one major attempt to limit 
entitlement is noteworthy mainly for the controversy it caused, despite its rather limited 
scope. In 1987 the so-called ‘suspension article 80’ was introduced, under which individuals 
from the ‘cohabitee’ group could – provided household income exceeded a relatively high 
threshold – be disqualified from benefit receipt if their unemployment spell was deemed 
‘abnormally long’. In 1987 this was considered to be twice the regional average duration, 
controlling for the age and gender and the benefit claimant, and in 1993 was shorted to 1.5 
times the regional average – which still meant that termination proceedings would not be 
initiated before at least 3 years of benefit receipt, and in some regions not until around 7 or 8 
years (Marx, 2007: 129). When in the 1990s the Ministry of Labor stepped up efforts to 
actually enforce this rule – which had previously been implemented with a discretion that 
shaded into deliberate laxity – there was still a major public outcry, and a strong mobilization 
led by movements of the unemployed and supported by the trade unions eventually forced the 
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government to limit the powers of the agents of the Public Employment Office to pursue 
cases of suspected abuse (Faniel, 2005). 
 
The upshot of this pattern of adjustment is that although unemployment benefits have lost 
value for all groups – and for some groups rather more so than for others – Belgian 
unemployment protection remains an institutionally integrated system, with a beneficiary rate 
consistently estimated at over 80% of the unemployed (De Lathouwer, 2002; De Deken, 
2011; Schömann et al, 2000). Unlike in many developed countries, there is furthermore no 
notable difference between men and women in the proportion of unemployed people in 
receipt of unemployment benefits in Belgium (De Deken, 2011) Following from this, social 
assistance has traditionally played only a very marginal role in the social protection of the 
unemployed; while total minimum income recipiency rates increased somewhat in the 1990s, 
at the end of the decade the total numbers of social assistance recipients were still less than a 
tenth of the number of people in receipt of unemployment benefits (De Lathouwer, 2002). 
Today social assistance remains a “truly residual system only providing means-tested benefits 
to those who are not part of the wage earning population, and a small minority of former wage 
earners who fail to meet the eligibility requirements of an otherwise very inclusive 
unemployment insurance scheme” (De Deken, 2011: X).  
 
3. Solidarity Incentives: Explaining Policy Choice in Unemployment Protection 
 
The Belgian and French unemployment protection systems have thus both experienced 
considerable parametric reforms in recent decades. In certain respects, the winners and losers 
in this adjustment process have been similar in both countries; being young or being a woman 
makes it more likely to have lower levels of unemployment benefit entitlement in Belgium, 
just as it makes it less likely to receive an insurance benefit when unemployed in France. But 
the fact that Belgian and French policy makers have pulled on different reform levers – 
mainly benefit levels in the former case, mainly contribution conditions and benefit duration 
in the latter – has had important consequences. In Belgium, an accessible and encompassing 
unemployment benefit system has been maintained, but at the cost of a progressive leveling 
down of benefits to a basic protection level, with a concomitant abandonment of any real 
insurance role of unemployment benefit for higher earners. In France, by contrast, preserving 
better rates of income replacement for many groups has meant accepting an increasingly 
exclusive ‘top tier’ unemployment benefit system, with the implication that other risk profiles 
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are now provided for – if at all – through subsidiary arrangements, on an explicitly means-
tested basis. Accordingly, most recent data shows that while unemployed people in France are 
less likely than their Belgian counterparts to have less than 70% of the equivalized median 
income, they are rather more likely to have less than 40% or 50% (Eurostat, 2010b). 
 
Athough levels of overall expenditure on unemployment benefits have converged in the two 
countries over the last quarter-century, the institutional and distributive logics at play have 
therefore been different. While in the French case we can witness an explicit dualization of 
unemployment protection into overlapping but discrete arrangements of distinctly different 
quality for ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’, in Belgium there has been an apparently more 
‘solidaristic’ sharing of the burdens of adjustment in this policy sector among different risk 
groups in the labor market. Given that the policy logic and distributive thrust of the broader 
socio-economic adjustment trajectories in both countries are otherwise so similar, the 
intriguing question is why unemployment insurance has not followed suit. 
 
In existing literature on the dualization of regulatory and institutional arrangements in 
Continental welfare-production regimes, reform of unemployment protection arrangements 
has largely been understood as a spill-over from the labor market adjustment strategies of 
powerful insider interests represented in coordinative institutions. In their analysis of France 
and Germany, Palier and Thelen (2010 and in this volume) thus argue that the dualization of 
unemployment protection in the two cases followed from the political and financial pressures 
generated by labor shedding strategies and the gradual development of a secondary labor 
market that resulted from the negotiated closure of internal labor markets by insiders. The 
logic is thus one of complementarities between welfare state reforms and broader labor 
market adjustment strategies, with the latter driving the former. As discussed above, however, 
labor shedding has been if anything more prevalent and consensual in Belgium than in France 
since the 1980s, and atypical employment has also expanded, albeit by less than in the French 
case. There is thus little reason to think that the less dualistic reform pattern in Belgian 
unemployment protection results from markedly different adjustment strategies and 
coalitional dynamics in the industrial relations sphere, and the functional pressures for change 
these generate. 
 
An alternative explanation for Franco-Belgian divergence could potentially reside in the party 
political sphere. It is widely argued that social democratic governments may have a 
significant impact on the extent to which dualizing labor market and social policy reforms 
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will be pursued, though controversy remains over the nature of the relationship (Palier and 
Thelen, 2010; Rueda, 2007). But over the period from 1980 to 2007 as a whole, the left share 
of cabinet seats in Belgium and France is very similar, averaging 40% and 48% (own 
calculations from Armingeon, 2007). While the nature of the countries’ electoral systems 
means left party participation in governments has been more intermittent in France than 
Belgium, there appears to be no clear link between the partisan composition of government 
and the reform choices made. Some of the most dualizing reforms in French unemployment 
protection were enacted under governments of both the left (1982-1984) and the right (1993), 
while the ‘basic protection turn’ in Belgian unemployment protection began when the left was 
out of government and has been continued since their return. In reality, governments of all 
partisan stripes find it difficult to exert influence over the direction of unemployment benefit 
reforms in both countries. Parametric adjustments in France are, as mentioned, formally based 
on autonomous collective agreements between the social partners, which are usually directly 
translated into law. In Belgium unemployment insurance legislation is mainly based on Royal 
Decrees that are not subject to Parliamentary debate, and the content of which is strongly 
influenced by a process of upstream negotiation with the social actors (Kuipers, 2006: 84).  
 
When examining the Belgian case it is of course important to consider the possible impact of 
the federal political system and the underlying linguistic cleavages, which have become 
considerably more salient in the period since 1980. This is undoubtedly important in 
understanding aspects of social policy (non-)reform in the Belgian case, particularly as the 
linguistic cleavage coincides with sharp differences in the social and labor market situations 
of Flanders and Wallonia (Poirier and Vansteenkiste, 2000). This incendiary nature of the 
‘regional question’ perhaps can help explain why governments and/or social actors have been 
reticent to push for tighter eligibility conditions for, or more limited entitlement to, 
unemployment benefit payments that might drive some of the unemployed onto the social 
assistance scheme. Given that the latter is part-financed by local government, such a change 
would lead to a damaging and highly controversial alteration in the flow of resources within 
the country (OECD, 1998: 102-103). More generally, distinguishing ‘professional solidarity’ 
from ‘national solidarity’ is undoubtedly more problematic when the latter is now so difficult 
and contested. But as discussed below the other policy preferences of social actors appear to 
systematically trump their regional identities, and thus moderate the influence of sub-state 
nationalism on policy decisions and non-decisions (see also Béland and Lecours, 2005). 
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It might be also argued, finally, that different historical and ideational legacies can help to 
explain why processes of post-industrialization in the labor market have produced such 
different unemployment policy results in the two cases. In part, the story told in the previous 
section is less one of divergence from a truly common starting point as it is of a reversion to 
first principles. As noted, the Belgian unemployment benefit system was always more 
oriented to basic protection, and had only really taken on a stronger insurance character in the 
1970s; inversely, in France the original vocation of UNEDIC was to provide replacement 
incomes to the normally securely employed, and it had only integrated more basic protection 
functions over time. Despite the institutional convergence at the end of the ‘golden age’, it 
could be argued that certain policy principles – such as time-unlimited unemployment 
benefits in Belgium, or their ‘professional’ character in France – had endured, and served as 
‘cognitive locks’ (cf. Blyth, 2001) that shaped the attitude and preferences of all actors when 
later faced with cost pressures. Such an argument would however overstate the degree of 
consensus over the parametric reform options available, and downplay the role of agency and 
choice in the privileging of one over others. For example, in their contribution to debates on 
the modernization of social security in the mid-1990s, the Belgian employers confederation 
argued that in each sector of social protection it was necessary to distinguish “that which is 
concerned with general solidarity – and must therefore be covered by general means – and 
that which is concerned with professional solidarity – and must be covered by contributions” 
(cited in Arcq and Reman, 1996: 27). A dualistic policy response to structural change was, 
then, on the table in Belgium as well as France. To explain why it was less influential in 
unemployment protection reforms in one case than the other we need to understand how 
different reform options intersect with the interests and preferences of other influential actors. 
 
It is argued here that the divergence between Belgian and French unemployment protection 
policies is best understood in relation to the preferences and strategies of trade unions in the 
two countries. Palier and Thelen (2010; and in this volume) also focus on (some) unions, 
emphasizing how the compromises they reach with the representatives of (some) employers 
when faced with the challenges of structural change encourage the adoption of dualistic 
policies across inter-related sub-spheres of coordinated market economies. With respect to 
unemployment protection issues, however, it is suggested here that the most important 
influence on the preferences of the unions is not the interests of their (insider) members, but 
rather their interests as organizations participating in the governance of unemployment 
insurance arrangements. While these organizational interests generate preferences for 
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dualistic policies in the French case, the difference in the way that social governance 
functions means that this is not the case in Belgium.    
 
French and Belgian trade unions are very different3. While France has the lowest rates of 
union density of any developed country, trade unions in Belgium are not only relatively 
strong in membership terms, but have also bucked a widespread trend by avoiding 
membership decline since the early 1980s. Between 1980 and 2007 union density fell from 
just under 20% to around 9% in France, while in Belgium it remained stable at around 55% 
(Visser, 2009). Some of the explanation for both the different levels of unions’ density and, 
even more so, for the divergent trends since the 1980s, is commonly argued to be found in the 
specific role of Belgian trade unions in the unemployment benefit system (Vandaele, 2006). 
Belgium is characterized by a ‘pseudo-Ghent’ unemployment benefit system, with unions 
acting as the ‘cash desks’ of the public unemployment insurance system, paying out benefits 
to the unemployed on behalf of the Public Employment Office. Though unlike in true Ghent 
systems unemployment insurance is compulsory and it is not necessary to join a union to be 
able claim benefits, 85% of the unemployed choose to do exactly that, because of the denser 
network of union payment offices, the better legal support services they provide and the fact 
that the union funds often pay benefits more rapidly (Faniel, 2008: 54). As a result, “the 
prospect of becoming unemployed ... drives employees into the unions” (Vandaele, 2006: 
652). 
 
Is it simply the greater overall strength of the Belgian unions, or the related fact that 
unemployed ‘outsiders’ are thus a significant minority of their members, that explains the 
divergence in Belgian and French unemployment policy (cf. De Deken, 2011; Eichhorst and 
Marx in this volume)? If this were the case, then we would surely anticipate the divergence 
between the Belgian and French cases to be even more wide-ranging and clear-cut than it is. 
In the field of unemployment benefit policy we would expect cost containment pressures to 
have been headed-off in Belgium altogether, rather than simply channeled in particular ways. 
We would furthermore not expect Belgian divergence to be contained to the sphere of 
unemployment, but instead impact on the broader socio-economic adjustment trajectory 
discussed in section 1. In particular, if the important variable were the greater representation 
                                                 
3 This paper discusses unions in an undifferentiated way, despite the existence of three representative national 
confederations in Belgium and five in France. While internal decision-making within confederations and 
competition between them obviously impacts on union preference formation in both countries, exploration of 
this is beyond the scope of this paper and is not necessary to understand the comparative argument developed 
here.  
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of ‘outsiders’ in Belgian unions, we would anticipate that labor market adjustment strategies 
as a whole, and not just in unemployment protection, should be more ‘outsider friendly’. The 
reality is that despite their membership profile Belgian unions do in fact generally privilege 
the interests of insiders, notably as a result of the limited mobilization of unemployed 
members inside them and the role of the unions’ leaders – always drawn from the core ‘rank 
and file’ of employed members – in setting policy strategies (Faniel, 2006; 2009). 
 
If the Belgian unions have resisted the dualization of unemployment protection specifically, it 
is rather because the way their organizational interests have shaped their policy preferences in 
this field. The unions’ governance role in unemployment benefit impacts not only on their 
inherited membership profile, but also on their forward-looking strategic preoccupations. As 
mentioned, participation in unemployment benefit administration acts as a ‘recruiting 
sergeant’ for Belgian trade unions, but it does so all the more effectively if employees know 
that they will be able to continue to receive benefits from the union funds irrespective of their 
contribution history or unemployment duration.. Furthermore, in addition to the cost of the 
benefit they pay out, the unions additionally receive a set administration fee – covering both 
operating and personnel costs – from ONEM for every unemployed person they pay benefit 
to. The resources flowing from this fee alone is estimated to represent around 25% of all 
union funds in Belgium (IGAS, 2004: 25), an income stream that would diminish if some of 
the unemployed were to receive benefits elsewhere, either from the public payment desk or in 
an alternative benefit system. Both recruitment and financial considerations can explain why 
the unions have long tried to limit the attractiveness of competing cash desks in the public 
system (Faniel, 2007: 19), but also why they are so keen to maintain the integrated structure 
of benefit provision. It thus helps us understand why they fought much harder against 
attempts to limit the duration of benefits than they have against declines in the insurance 
function (Kuipers, 2006: 82-83; Marx, 2007: 155), despite the fact that this in principle 
benefits outsiders more than insiders. 
 
The force of these organizational interests is underscored by the way that they appease the 
potential tensions and policy dissensions the might result from sub-national and linguistic 
cleavages that cut across organized labor in Belgium. Though the Catholic ACV/CSC has a 
clear majority of Flemish members, unlike the Flemish political parties it has never shown 
much enthusiasm for the regionalization of the social protection system (Béland and Lecours, 
2005: 279; Palsterman, 2007: 21). There is far less disagreement on the importance of 
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maintaining a federal social protection system between the various unions than between 
Belgian political parties, who compete for voters – many of whom are union members – on 
fiercely regionalist platforms (Palsterman, 2007). 
 
The historical legitimacy of the governance arrangements in unemployment insurance, rooted 
in history of Belgian unemployment protection and symbolically related to the ‘social pact’ of 
1944 (Pasture, 1993), plays an important role too. Due to this ‘organic’ legitimacy, there is no 
perception that union administration is any less justified in the context of heavy state 
subsidization of unemployment insurance. As noted above, the state subsidy to the 
unemployment insurance fund was as high as 80% around 1980, without this ever seriously 
calling into question the legitimacy of the unions’ governance role. This also allows the 
unions to press for the policies they prefer without their core membership necessarily having 
to bear a disproportionate cost through social contributions. 
 
Though the French trade unions also participate in the governance of unemployment benefits, 
they face a very different set of institutional incentives. As noted, French unemployment 
benefits are managed through periodic collective agreements between the social partners 
subject only to erga omnes extension by the state, a system known as paritarisme. Unique for 
any public unemployment insurance in the developed world, this governance structure is an 
artifact of the origins of UNEDIC, which was initially established as a complementary system 
of benefit provision through which the social partners could manage their labor market needs. 
Though it does not bring any membership benefits to the French unions, it does give them 
access to precious financial resources, including a share of a public subsidy for ‘the 
functioning of paritarisme’. While it is notoriously difficult to establish their magnitude 
exactly (Hadas-Lebel, 2006: 60), these resources – as well as the political status paritarisme 
affords - appear particularly crucial to the organizational viability of French unions, given 
their very low membership rates. For this reason their interests in the unemployment 
protection sphere have always been about preserving the viability of paritarisme, as well as 
defending the rights of employees (Clegg, 2005).  
 
As in Belgium, though, the unions’ organizational interests within a given institutional 
configuration have a knock-on effect for their unemployment policy preferences. As the 
missions of UNEDIC have expanded, its paritaire functioning has become increasingly 
vulnerable to questions and criticisms regarding its appropriateness. Lacking any organic 
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justification for their governance role in the context of a fundamentally statist political 
culture, the autonomous contributory financing structure of the institution is the social 
partners’ main argument against these criticisms; unemployment insurance is funded entirely 
out of contributions paid by firms and workers, and it is therefore still appropriate that their 
representatives should be charged with its co-management. When in 1982 the employers 
refused to countenance further contribution increases, and the state refused to extend its 
recently instituted subsidy without taking on an explicit managerial role, the unions were 
faced with a choice; risk the demise of the paritaire system or negotiate selective reductions 
in benefits. 
 
It would have been conceivable to maintain a relatively integrated benefit system within 
stable financial parameters by reducing the replacement rate at the higher end, or by 
restricting benefit entitlement for those with longer work- and contribution-records. Instead, 
the union preference was for the adjustment pattern outlined above; the maintenance of 
generous replacement rates for good contributors, and the acceptance that others would need 
to rely on tax-financed national solidarity provisions. Partly, this can be explained by the 
intersection of the unions’ defense of paritarisme with their representational bias towards a 
core membership of older, securely employed workers. But the defense of paritarisme also 
played a role in union preference formation that was independent of any ‘logic of 
membership’. On the one hand, by tightening the link between contributions and entitlements, 
the reform choices have reaffirmed the insurance character of unemployment insurance, and – 
in addition to the autonomous financing structure – helped bolster legitimacy for the system’s 
management by the social partners. On the other, the survival of paritarisme required 
common ground being found between both the unions and the employers, which meant that 
the former were obliged to take on board the preferences of the latter in a way that Belgian 
unions were not.  
 
As Palier and Thelen (2010; and in this volume) have argued, then, the dualization of French 
unemployment insurance resulted from a compromise between unions and employers 
structuring policy development in this field. What the preceding discussion has shown, 
however, is that the reason the French unions sought to reach such a compromise, and 
accepted the parametric reform choices on which it could be built, is intimately related to their 
organizational interest in preserving their role in unemployment insurance governance. As the 
Belgian case illustrates, under a different governance arrangement the maximization of 
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organizational benefits to unions can be much less dependent on the formation of cross-class 
compromises, and encourage the adoption of a very different set unemployment policy of 
preferences. Even in similar welfare-production regimes, the adoption of dualistic welfare 
policy responses to the post-industrialization of labor markets is therefore far from inevitable. 
 
Conclusion: The Importance of Minor Differences 
 
The rise of the industrial working class was one of the key sociological developments of the 
early part of the 20th century, and a crucial driver of social policy development. It now 
appears clear that post-industrialization of labor markets has been a key feature of the fin de 
siècle and is structuring social policy development into the new century. But just as the rise of 
labor power, and its political and policy impact, was shaped by variations in often apparently 
rather technical features of existing policy institutions across countries (Rothstein, 1992), so 
institutional variations in established public policies are mediating the impact of structural 
labor market change on the preferences of organized interests and on its implications for 
social policy development. 
 
The analysis of the recent development of unemployment protection policies in Belgium and 
France in this chapter provides one example of this. Despite similar macro-institutional 
settings, unemployment protection policies evolved very differently in the two cases, leading 
to a progressive shift to a minimum protection model for all the unemployed in the Belgian 
case, and the adoption and maintenance of a dualized unemployment protection structure in 
the French. This divergence can be explained, it has been argued, by the way that the link 
between union strategies to maximize organizational rents and benefits, on the one hand, and 
their policy preferences, on the other, is mediated by the structure and operation of social 
governance institutions in the sector. Even though they are generally ‘insider’ membership 
organizations unions’ policy preferences will not necessarily manifest an insider bias, as these 
actors also – and perhaps even mainly – pursue organizational goals. How these goals 
translate into policy preferences, though, depends on the structure and operation of social 
governance arrangements, which can vary considerably between countries in the same 
welfare-production regime, and even from policy sector to policy sector in the same country 
(Ebbinghaus, 2010). While unemployment protection in Belgium and France illustrates this 
phenomenon well the argument also has broader relevance, as suggested by the importance of 
unions’ organizational interests in specific governance arrangements in shaping their labor 
Comment [SH4]: I am not sure 
you can draw this conclusion from teh 
analysis in this chapter, since both 
competing variables (membership 
structure and organizational intersts / 
union financing) covary identically. 
French unions are more insider-
oriented and have no organizational 
interests to advocate outsider-interests, 
whereas Belgian unions have more 
outsider members and have an 
organizational interest in providing 
benefits to them. you cannot really tell 
which one made the difference here. 
Given this research design, I would 
formulate this conclusion more 
carefully.  
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market and unemployment protection reform preferences in countries such as the Netherlands 
(Clegg et al., 2010) and Sweden (Anderson, 2001). 
 
What broader conclusions can we draw regarding the politics of dualization in social 
protection? The argument suggests, firstly, that even in relatively similar macro-institutional 
settings and faced with similar functional pressures, a dualizing dynamic will not necessarily 
‘cascade down’ into social protection reform from developments in the productive sphere. 
Social policies such as unemployment insurance are core societal institutions, too important in 
their own right to the interests and strategies of collective actors to simply reflect or react to 
change in the labor market. This is of course not to deny the existence of linkages between the 
productive sphere and the realm of social protection. It is to suggest, however, that – 
especially in the short-term – coherence or complementarity between the two is not inevitable, 
and that the causal arrow between developments in the two spheres runs in both directions. 
With regard to the latter point, the cases analyzed here perhaps provide some good examples 
of this. If temporary employment has grown only moderately in Belgium since the 1980s 
despite high labor costs and relatively rigid protection of standard employment (Eichhorst and 
Marx in this volume), this may be in part because an encompassing unemployment insurance 
system has given potential cheap labor an ‘exit option’ that they do not have elsewhere. 
Inversely, the fast expansion of atypical employment statuses in France was probably as much 
a result of the dualization of unemployment protection – which left many people without any 
benefit-based income protection at all – as it was a driver of it. In both cases it can be argued 
that social protection reforms have their own autonomous political logic and dynamic, which 
shapes as much as it is shaped by developments in the labor market. 
 
A second implication of the analysis is that if the policy preferences of collective actors such 
as trade unions are as much institutionally as sociologically generated, then they can in 
principle be shaped through institutional and governance reform. Though institutional reform 
is never easy, governments operating in policy environments characterized by traditions of 
social partner influence may under certain circumstances therefore be able to alter the course 
of policy development and impact on distributive outcomes not only through monetary side-
payments, but also through ‘meta-reforms’ (cf. Clegg, 2007) that change the incentives of 
social actors. This seems to be exactly what French governments have belatedly realized with 
respect to unemployment protection. In the process of a 2008 reform that merged the 
unemployment insurance system and the public employment service at delivery level in 
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France, it was made very clear to the French unions that the preservation of paritarisme in 
unemployment insurance would depend on their negotiating policies that were a better fit with 
(the current government’s interpretation of) the general interest (Willmann, 2009). It was in 
this context that the 2009 unemployment insurance agreement innovated with a parametric 
reform that reduced the maximum duration of benefit payment for some better contributors 
while relaxing the minimum contribution conditions considerably. This reform seems set to 
enlarge access to first-tier unemployment insurance, and possibly represents a first step 
towards a more institutionally integrated system of post-industrial unemployment protection. 
 
Would such a change help to combat inequalities in the French labor market and society? This 
brings forth a final consideration, of a more speculative nature, regarding the effect of the 
different reform trajectories discussed in this chapter. While it may be tempting to read social 
and distributional outcomes off from institutional structures, it is probably a temptation that 
should be resisted. Though Belgian unions’ organizational interests led them to support what 
appears prima facie to be a more ‘solidaristic’ unemployment benefit reform strategy than 
their French homologues, it was noted above that Belgium has some of the highest rates of 
long- and very long-term unemployment in the developed world. Furthermore, while the 
Belgian adjustment trajectory appears to date to have limited the extent of severe poverty 
among the unemployed, the decline of the insurance function may actually undercut political 
support for such solidarity in the longer-term (Marx, 2007). This chapter has focused on the 
political drivers of reforms that tend to dualize, or otherwise, social protection structures and 
arrangements. How far these alternative reform paths reinforce or mitigate different kinds of 
social inequalities over the long-term is a related but separate question, important enough to 
merit explicit investigation in its own right.  
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